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Introduction
* 
The end of the Cold War opened new perspectives for the intensification, acceleration and even 
democratisation of the European integration process. Since then the European Union (EU) has become 
active on even more policy fields, including former core competencies of the respective nation states. 
Meanwhile, EU-governance touches fields that have hitherto been regarded to be at the core of 
national sovereignty, as they are deeply rooted in particular national traditions—like constitutional 
policy, social policy, security and defence, immigration, internal security or biotechnology. Despite 
occasional setbacks, this amazing development of a relatively small foreign trade zone for the goods of 
one branch of industry in the 1950s to the worldwide only multinational political system at the turn of 
the century represents an impressive success story. 
Nevertheless, many observers doubt that the EU is ready for democratisation and grand future 
projects like common social policies or a common security and defence policy. Drawing more or less 
explicitly on communitarian views
1 of the political process, many argue that the EU citizens, 
apparently, first need a common identity in order to accept common rules and institutions and 
especially in order to be able to decide in common upon ethically sensitive conflict-issues (among 
others see: Lindberg / Scheingold, 1970; most recently see: Herrmann / Brewer, 2004: 2 f.; Risse, 
2004: 250; Eriksen, 2005: 342 f.). In tension with his procedural theory of democracy, even Habermas 
agreed on the deficit description of a missing European identity and later spoke of the need for a 
shared material understanding of a European (social democratic) life-form as well as a common 
interpretation of European history (Habermas, 1995, 2001). 
The paper will help to provide some answers to these issues by arguing that conceptual weaknesses 
of the term ‘collective identity’ inherited from social, philosophical, and sociological tradition led to a 
confusion of several analytic dimensions of ‘identity’ and to an overestimation of the role of one 
especially strong form of collective identity as functional prerequisite of democracy. In order to show 
this point the paper proceeds as follows:  
The first part will provide a short overview of the debate on the perceived functional need of a 
European identity for legitimate EU governance. This will be briefly illustrated with three policy 
examples: constitutional, welfare, and foreign and defence policy. The second and third parts will 
introduce theoretical insights of analytic philosophy into the social science discourse on collective 
identity in order to redefine and differentiate the concept of ‘collective identity’. The ways in which 
people refer to themselves as members of we-groups will be clarified in order to contribute to an 
innovative model of the problem and therefore policy-related formation of collective identities. In each 
sub-section the relevance of these conceptual considerations for evaluating whether or not ‘the 
Europeans’ see themselves as members of a community will be shortly outlined. The paper concludes 
that a strong European identity is not a functional precondition for legitimate democratic governance 
in the EU as far as every day politics is concerned. Only in extraordinary situations and in order to 
institutionalise integration in ethically sensitive policy fields is it necessary that the EU-citizens 
discursively agree on an ethical self-understanding of their way of life.  
                                                      
*   This paper was written thanks to the Vincent-Wright-Fellowship in Comparative Politics in the academic year 2004/05 at 
the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence. It owes much to the 
lively discussions at the RSCAS. Especially I would like to thank Christine Chwaszcza, Gerard Delanty, Peter J. 
Katzenstein, Thomas Risse, Bo Stråth, Udo Tietz, Pascal Vennesson and two anonymous reviewers for their stimulating 
comments. Many thanks also to Erick Feijoó for language editing. 
1    Communitarians believe that the democratic process rests upon strong pre-political ties between the members of a 
political community. Tradition, solidarity and shared ethnic, religious, cultural, and so forth identities are in that view 
social preconditions for the modern democratic process. Cathleen Kantner 
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1. Beyond identity? 
1.1. The perceived functional need of a European identity 
With accelerating speed European Union governance became active on new policy fields formerly at 
the core of national sovereignty. This increasingly includes policy areas that are highly value-laden. 
Some of them have been constitutive for a nation’s way into modernity and the evolution of national 
democratic institutions. National policies in ethically sensitive fields have their specific history—a 
history of ‘hot’ conflicts in which ‘national identity’ and the national political system coevolved. It is 
out of different democratic experiences and not only out of stubbornness that Europeans have different 
views on ethically sensitive policy fields. 
If areas as constitutional policy, social policy, security and defence, immigration, internal security, 
or biotechnology come under EU-induced reform pressure, integration may tend to become highly 
controversial. Many analysts, therefore, suppose that national diversity clashes with European 
ambitions and that shared values are the necessary common ground for consensus and solidarity. 
Without shared values European governance in these ethically sensitive policy fields would be 
condemned to fail. This reasoning can be illustrated by some examples: constitutional, welfare, and 
foreign and defence policy. 
Example 1: National democratic constitutions can be understood as culturally specific 
interpretations of universal principles. These interpretations are specific because the content of 
universal principles was ‘discovered’ and institutionalised in very particular contexts and conflict 
situations. Constitutions can—under normative and historical aspects—be viewed as the outcome of 
generations over generations of conflict over the general procedures of decision making and the 
definition of a democratic nation’s collective projects (Habermas, 1998: Ch. 5). They define the rules 
under which the members of the national political community came to solve their conflicts in all other 
policy fields. From a social-historical point of view they also mirror historical fights, the achievements 
and compromises that emerged. In that way they reflect historical defeats or victories of certain 
societal groups.
2 But even those groups who once did not agree with the institutional choices made 
have later on been fighting for reforms within the established frameworks and are—even in a critical 
attitude—integrated into the historically evolved system. Our ancestors’ decisions and compromises 
shaped later political conflicts as well as the political opportunity structures for a broad variety of 
established and newly emerging collective actors. They had once good reasons for institutionalising 
certain policies in a certain way. The memorised history of policy settings is one important reason why 
the members of the national political communities usually find much value in their status quo policy 
practices. Even oppositional actors are therefore often very sceptical when a significantly different 
policy setting becomes available. They know ‘the game’ within the status quo and how to gradually 
achieve improvements. Once everything is open to change, as it seems to be the case in the European 
context, they might—paradoxically—become aware of how much they are normatively and practically 
integrated.
3  European  constitutional policy therefore appears especially difficult. Beyond the 
underlying liberal principles which are shared across Europe, how should the resulting diversity of 
ways to spell out those principles be integrated into a common European constitution? In view of that 
situation, a European identity becomes essential for legitimising European governance. 
Example 2: National welfare policies are very important for many European nations’ collective 
self-understanding. Citizens are proud of their country’s social achievements and the resulting specific 
balance between liberty and welfare. National social policies were institutionalised under specific 
                                                      
2   First comparative discourse analyses of the debate on the European constitution have recently been published (Trenz, 
2004b; Fossum / Trenz, 2005; Oberhuber et al., 2005). 
3   Public reluctance to change therefore is not only a matter of threatened group interests—often enough those interests 
would be favoured by a change—but it expresses a paradox of normative integration. Citizens know and—that should not 
to be underestimated—accept the normative justifications their ancestors gave for deciding in favour of a certain set of rules. What is a European Identity? The Emergence of a Shared Ethical Self-Understanding in the European Union 
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historical circumstances based on a specific rationale and were fought for by certain coalitions of 
actors against others.
4 Historical compromises shaped the outline of the initial institutional settings in a 
policy field. The specific collective understandings of certain social rights and entitlements, what 
constitutes a claim, who deserves what, and who owes what mirror the specific conflict histories of 
coping with the social question. Although welfare issues are now addressed at the European level, 
those questions are not answered everywhere in the same way. It would mean downplaying the 
possible range of dissent if one were to assume from the existence of advanced welfare policy regimes 
in (most) EU member states that these nations follow a common European welfare state tradition.
5 It 
might be that under changing conditions the national welfare state fails to find enough engaged 
supporters and that there may be a lack of public support and political will to allow for the 
institutionalisation of redistributive social policies on the European level.
6 The acceptance of burdens 
within a European solidarity regime is in the communitarian view thought to be dependent on the 
existence of a strong common European identity (Offe, 1998: 120; Vobruba, 1999, 2001: 126). While 
the degree of homogeneity within the nation state is sometimes overestimated
7, it is widely accepted 
that the legitimacy of European welfare provisions depends on social identities which foster the 
acceptance of moral duties and compliance with the common good.  
Example 3: Foreign and defence policy is another highly sensitive policy field. On the occasion of 
the US-led intervention in Iraq 2003 it became visible how differently the EU member states perceived 
the issue. It has been heavily criticised that Europe once again failed to speak with one voice. A 
deep—identity-related—split between (most of the) old and (some of the) new members seemed to 
emerge. Huge anti-war demonstrations occurred in most member states as well as in the soon-to-be 
member states, and—with regard to the justification of the war—public opinion across Europe was 
clearly against the war.
8 Nonetheless, in countries like Poland strong moral arguments in favour of the 
intervention were brought forward by politicians and even civil society actors. In Germany such a 
position was almost unthinkable. This illustrates that national views on foreign policy, especially 
questions of war and peace, are deeply shaped by collective experiences. It makes a difference 
whether a political community has been the target of aggressions or the aggressor in the past. It 
matters whether our ancestors were colonialists who exploited other countries, but at the same time 
perhaps learned to pay more attention to very distant parts of the world and the ‘ways of life’ of the 
local populations.
9 For today’s view on the role of the United Nations it makes a difference under 
which historical circumstances the members of a political community learned to value international 
organisations (Lenz / Schmidt / von Wrochem, 2002; Levy / Sznaider, 2002; Alexander, 2002; 
Alweiss, 2003; Giesen, 2004). Nonetheless, based on ‘a common European identity’—many believe—
Europe could have played a much more decisive role in international politics in the recent decade. 
Moreover, it could have contributed to the further development of a just, multilateral, and legally 
bounded world order (see among others: Habermas / Derrida, 2003; Habermas, 2004; Fischer, 2000, 2005). 
On issues like European immigration, internal security, or biotechnology policy quite similar 
stories could be told. The more European integration touches policy action beyond pure market 
regulation, the more it exposes concerned policy makers, civil society actors, and ordinary citizens to 
                                                      
4   See among others Baldwin, Esping-Andersen and Skocpol (Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Skocpol, 1992). 
5   Most prominently, Habermas, among many others, takes a common heritage of welfare state convictions for granted as a 
common European ethical resource that just would have to be rediscovered in its European dimension (Habermas, 2001).  
6   Eurobarometer data seem to suggest that there is no unequivocal support for a European welfare responsibility and that 
there are severe cleavages along the lines of region and culture (Mau, 2005). 
7   Also ‘at home’ in the nation state, the rich do not happily pay for the poor. 
8   Except in Denmark a vast majority in ‘old Europe’ considered the intervention not justified (European Commission, 
2003: 4-5). Regarding the question where to go from here, there are however very strong differences in public opinion 
across the EU (see e.g. whether one’s nation should send troops to stabilise Iraq, ibid.: 40-41). 
9   There is not yet much empirical research on this aspect (Hansen, 2002; MacQueen, 2003; Joerges / Ghaleigh, 2003). Cathleen Kantner 
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tremendous political uncertainty—in normative as well as in practical terms. However exaggerated 
some assumptions about the presumed strength of national identity or the assumed value consensus 
within the national publics are, it seems to be plausible that some sort of broadly shared convictions 
are the precondition for the institutionalization of the grand collective policy projects the EU has 
already put on its agenda. 
Yet, when an issue is recognised as an important problem with significant normative implications, 
the more fundamental part of the dispute starts: What are normatively justifiable responses to the 
problem? How do we want to live together? Who do we want to be in the future? Deep disagreements 
may occur and—at first—blockade institutional reforms and the implementation of normatively 
sensitive policy projects. It might even be that the more the process is opened to public participation, 
the more intense the obstruction might be—as recently when the constitutional referenda in the 
Netherlands and France in 2005 failed. 
Strong collective identities are a rare thing in any modern society. In a transnational framework, 
moreover, any aspirations for a significant reduction of the complexity and heterogeneity of values 
would run into disappointment, especially when ‘hot’ political issues are discussed on a European 
scale. How to accommodate twenty five different national experiences with regard to normative issues 
like constitutional policy, redistributive social policies, external security and defence, immigration, 
internal security, or biotechnology, historical traumas and related fears, as well as sometimes heavy 
burdens of historical guilt that normatively constrain the range of acceptable policy choices?
10 Given 
their overwhelming heterogeneity, how could the EU-citizens ever arrive at common normative 
standards for the evaluation of European policy action with regard to these delicate issues? 
Admittedly, diversity has to be part of European unity (among others see: Wallace, 1985; Reif, 1993; 
Delanty, 1995; Delanty / Rumford, 2005; Eriksen / Fossum, 2004; Fossum, 2004). 
If these contradicting concerns are valid—(a) identity is a functional precondition of democracy 
and (b) there will be no stable substrate of common European values to draw on—the question of how 
it will be possible to find common solutions for complicated and ethically sensitive affairs is becoming 
increasingly urgent the further the integration process penetrates former core functions of national 
sovereignty. 
1.2. What is a ‘collective identity’? 
In order to bring into realisation grand collective projects in ethically sensitive policy fields, a political 
community needs not only rational agreement, but also some enthusiasm among its members. Indeed, 
it needs strong public support at least in the initiation phase of a new collective project. Without a 
‘collective identity’ beyond the borders of the national communities as common ground for common 
future projects, European efforts to institutionalise common political solutions, procedures, and 
sometimes very expensive commitments might fail. Obviously, there is much public, political, and 
scientific interest in questions of European identity formation. Yet, what is this presumably missing 
‘collective identity’ about? 
The concept is often used imprecisely. It is only clear that it refers to actors’ deep convictions and 
that it includes all the features that other, ‘harder’ types of theories do not catch: properties like values, 
traditions, culture, morality, religious beliefs, and so on. ‘Identity’ tends to be a catch-all phrase for the 
presumably needed ‘thick’ moral underpinnings of social and political order. It is considered to be 
something that ‘makes things easier’ because everybody who belongs to the community believes in the 
same set of values. A common identity is regarded to provide a communitarian fundament for bridging 
deep conflict and for the acceptance of sacrifices in favour of the common good. Shared values are 
                                                      
10  About the difficulties of coming to terms with past traumatic experiences of victims as well as perpetrators see e.g. 
Giesen and Elster (Giesen, 2004; Elster, 2004). What is a European Identity? The Emergence of a Shared Ethical Self-Understanding in the European Union 
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considered to provide a common evaluative ground—some conflicts then do not occur. But, this 
‘resource’ gets eaten up in everyday political conflicts and unfortunately it cannot be arbitrarily 
reproduced (Böckenförde, 1991: 112).
11 Furthermore, these strong common beliefs are often thought 
to be derived from certain substantial commonalities of the group members (e.g. ethnic, cultural, 
traditional, religious uniformity, and so forth) and to translate into feelings of commonness. 
After decades of intense discussions about national, ethnic, and European identities, the concept of 
‘collective identity’ seems to have lost all clear cut analytical contours (Niethammer, 2000). Brubaker 
and Cooper even proposed to completely give up this inflationary used term, replacing it with other 
more precise categories (Brubaker / Cooper, 2000). Still, ‘collective identity’ is an indispensable 
concept of cultural and political sociology needed in order to theorise and to conduct empirical 
research about value-oriented collective action (Giesen, 2002, 2004; Eder, 2003). One can hardly deny 
that there are collectives which are involved in internal or external conflicts not simply because of 
material interests, but rather because of matters like mutual acknowledgment and ethics—questions 
along the lines of ‘what is good or better for us to do?’. 
In this perspective, the terms with which Brubaker/Cooper recommend ‘identity’ to be replaced do 
not solve any conceptual problems, since neither purely descriptive terms
12 nor rather ‘emotional’ 
terms like ‘feeling connectedness’ (Brubaker / Cooper, 2000: 19-21) provide the theoretical means to 
cope with strong normative convictions shared by the members of a community. 
We need some conceptual tools in order to handle those ‘thick’ ethical convictions (Walzer, 1994) 
for which the members of a community sometimes do fight passionately and for which they might be 
willing to make sacrifices. Obviously, in those cases we are observing not just an accumulation of 
individuals who contingently share these or those characteristics or who ‘feel’ something. In those 
cases we are encountering a very special quality of social relations (see: Tietz, 2002: 64-72).  
2. The categorisation trap: Numerical identification 
In the effort to raise ‘objective’ criteria for the study of collective identities one could be tempted to 
classify people according to certain criteria they do meet. The descriptive terms Brubaker/Cooper 
suggested give examples of different ways of categorising objects—humans or anything else
13—by 
certain characteristics (Brubaker / Cooper, 2000: 14 ff.). Living on a certain territory, ethnic origin, 
culture, religion, language, history, life style, and the like are often used indicators to identify groups 
that are then assumed to have a strong collective identity. 
What we can grasp from the standpoint of a neutral observer is, however, only numerical 
identification (Tietz, 2002: 215 ff.). Yet, even if a number of individuals share certain identifiable 
characteristics it does not imply that these characteristics are meaningful for their individual or 
collective life. In fact, it does not predetermine whether these individuals perceive themselves as 
members of a group. Identifying individuals numerically is treating them like objects—we do not yet 
know whether the chosen characteristics are relevant to the individuals concerned. 
Following Tietz and Brubaker/Cooper, I therefore propose to distinguish between numerical 
identification (or categorisation) and qualitative  identity. Only the latter one may include value-
judgements and the ethical self-understanding of the individuals concerned ( Tietz, 2002: 215 ff.; 
Brubaker / Cooper, 2000: 14ff.). 
                                                      
11  In contrast, Habermas showed that a civil form of solidarity has been and can be produced in the democratic process 
(Habermas, 1998: Ch. 4). 
12  Brubaker/Cooper propose terms like ‘identification’ and ‘categorisation’ by external observers or agencies like the state, 
‘social location,’ or ‘self-understanding’. But even ‘self-understanding’ is used in a descriptive sense of counting oneself 
among a certain class of objects and is an ethically neutral matter of self-description (Brubaker / Cooper, 2000: 17). 
13  Needless to say: stones, toys, computer, dogs as well as ‘speaking’ computers or parrots do not have qualitative identities. Cathleen Kantner 
6  EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2006/28 © 2006 Cathleen Kantner 
The distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not a matter of splitting hairs. It is due 
to the fundamental insight that a ‘social fact’ (Durkheim, 1950) does not follow automatically from 
empirical facts. Already the claim for existence of such a group as a social group could be contested as 
well as the membership of each single individual. From the perspective of a neutral observer nothing 
at all can be said about the self-understanding of the individuals concerned. 
Nevertheless, numerical identification is not a trivial thing. If we can identify some objects in space 
and time by certain criteria it is logically implied that the pure existence of those objects is already out 
of question: ‘No identity without entity’ (Quine, 1981: 102). That is not unimportant in social life. 
Numerical identification—leaving open how the individuals concerned think of themselves—might be 
useful: e.g. for the purposes of social statistics, bureaucracies, or for legal uses these criteria are 
sufficient.
14 We operate with them. But, for the sociological question about deliberate and active 
membership in a political community it is inadequate. 
Substantialist conceptions of collective identity typically get trapped at this point: they suggest that 
primordial, cultural or linguistic similarities per se constitute social community.
15 They confuse the 
ontological dimension (numerical identification) with the hermeneutic dimension of the ethical self-
understanding of the members of a community.  
Different numerical identification strategies have been used to distinguish ‘the Europeans’ from the 
rest of mankind by cultural heritage, by reference of them having been part of ancient, medieval, or 
modern European empires, by ethnicity, religion, traditions, and so forth. These strategies, however, 
have often paid little attention to the question of to what degree (some of) these ‘objective’ features 
are considered to be relevant at all by the individuals concerned (for an overview of strategies to 
distinguish between Europe and the outside see among others: Münkler, 1996; Malmborg / Stråth, 2002). 
Such attempts categorise people along observable characteristics taken either from the present or 
the past. Some of those typical identification strategies are more plausible than others—however, pure 
categorisation of people according to some criteria does not yet constitute group membership or 
establish mutual obligations of any kind. None of the many trials to define the limits of Europe by 
apparently pre-given criteria could give an answer to the question of European identity. Likewise, 
none could convincingly encompass all the little and big exemptions in history, the cross connections, 
the flows of migrants and goods, and the cultural, economic, religious, and political influences 
between the core of ‘Europe,’ its peripheries, neighbouring regions, and more distant parts of the 
world. None of these attempts could quiet the intense debates about who belongs to Europe and who 
does not. The question stays contested. 
There is, however, one formal criterion that has strong practical implications. This single, most 
relevant common political characteristic of the Europeans is the European citizenship status. On the 
base of this criterion the EU-citizens are clearly to identify numerically from the perspective of a 
neutral observer: everybody who holds citizenship status in any member state is a member. This 
‘group’ has no essential features—its size changes with the borders of the Union: every enlargement 
broadens it; a withdrawal of one member state would reduce it. Like any other numerical 
identification, it is ascribed regardless of the self-understanding of the individuals. Yet, there is no 
ontological doubt: the described individuals exist and they are the ones who have certain real rights 
                                                      
14  For the individual citizen membership in a political community usually coincides with the classification by national 
authorities: Whoever possesses a Norwegian passport is Norwegian, usually also lives and works there most of his life, 
has the right to vote, and the obligation to pay taxes. Problematic cases like permanent inhabitants without full citizen 
status, however, illustrate that ‘objective’ characteristics do not automatically lead to the inclusion into a community (see: 
Brubaker, 1990; Walzer, 1983). 
15  Under ‘substantialist’ conceptions of collective identity I understand models that assume that certain essential properties 
or natural features per se determine collective identities. What is a European Identity? The Emergence of a Shared Ethical Self-Understanding in the European Union 
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and duties.
16 This situation certainly creates real world experiences which can become the starting 
point for developments of qualitative identities as will become clear in the following sections.  
To sum up, generally and in the case of the European Union the problem of collective identities is 
not to be solved from the perspective of the neutral observer. We need to take the perspective of the 
participants and ask for the self-understanding of the individuals concerned. When then do individuals 
refer to themselves as members of a community? How do they use the pronoun ‘we’? What sorts of 
convictions do the members of a ‘we-community’ share with one another? 
3. Qualitative identities: Universal and particularistic identities 
In the footsteps of new accounts of analytic philosophy, I will in the following part of this article 
distinguish between three types of qualitative identities. This is not intended to simply add another 
typology to the discourse. It aims instead at showing a quite simple way to overcome some of the 
typical aporias of sociological thinking on collective identities.  
Analytic philosophers used to clarify and logically analyse conceptual problems by scrutinising the 
use of natural language. The question of how we can meaningfully speak about a certain concept 
proved to be especially fruitful because it released philosophical thought from several classical 
dichotomies. Recent accounts of analytic philosophy applied this methodology to the use of the 
personal pronoun ‘we’ which we use to refer to groups we are part of. As a result, three ideal-typical 
kinds of qualitative identity from the perspective of the speaking participant could be distinguished 
and marked by indexes (Tietz, 2002: 54-72): the community of all beings that have the capacity for 
language and action (we 1) and two kinds of groups smaller than the entire mankind. Those can be 
referred to as particularistic we-communities. The members of groups who interact and co-operate for 
the purpose of different aims will be called we 2/commercium. And finally there are also particularistic we-
communities who pursue together some ‘social goods’ (Walzer, 1983: 6-10) and developed a 
collective identity in the sense of a shared ethical self-understanding. They will be called we 2/communio. 
Philosophers used to describe communities as groups of individuals who share certain beliefs 
(Rorty, 1986). For the sake of systematic discussion, we shall have a look at what can be said about 
the convictions that the members of the three ideal-typical ‘we’-communities share with one another. 
While analytic philosophy proceeds by formal logical analysis or common sense reasoning about the 
meaningful use of certain terms, the social sciences after the constructivist turn are well equipped to 
empirically study the different uses of the personal pronoun ‘we’ and which convictions individuals 
share. That way it is possible to transform these philosophical concepts into operational concepts for 
the social sciences (Héran, 1987; Herrmann, 2002). In the next sections I will therefore on the one 
hand further explain the different ways speakers express their conviction of being part of a 
community, and on the other hand sketch in each instance what might follow from an analytic 
approach to collective identity for the study of European identity. 
3.1. Humankind: The universal we1 
Sometimes people use the personal pronoun of the first person plural by referring to mankind in 
general—in comparison to animals, the dead material world, computers, and so forth. This use is far 
from meaningless: it is indeed the expression of the fact that the members of this community are 
competent speakers of one or another natural language. By learning their first language, humans 
develop a linguistic sense, and they develop it together with the consciousness of sharing this sense 
with all humans and only with humans (Tietz, 2002: 54-64). This already includes a plenitude of true 
                                                      
16  The five freedoms of the internal market apply to every EU-citizen. EU regulations and policies are valid in each member 
state and are implemented by the nation states.  Cathleen Kantner 
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convictions about the objective, social and subjective world: e.g. that the sun rises in the morning, that 
children need protection, or that people need to eat when they are hungry.
17 Countless of these 
convictions are valid across all boundaries of language and culture. The universal we  1-community 
includes all beings capable of speech and action.
18 ‘Membership’ in this community is the logical 
precondition of being at all a candidate for membership in any particularistic we 2-community.  
What can be said about the identity of the Europeans in this sense? First of all, it is evident that the 
EU-citizens are ‘members’ of the universal we 1. As such they can become members of particularistic 
we 2 groups: they know what it means to become and to be a member of a group. Because they share a 
linguistic sense, they are moreover potentially able to overcome language barriers, cultural 
differences, and the like by walking through the ‘hermeneutic circle’ (for the case of transnational 
political communication see: Kantner, 2003, 2004: 111-130). The language games of the Europeans 
are not incommensurable. They can start to communicate with each other if they want to. Like all 
humans, EU-citizens are potentially able to cooperate with each other in order to accomplish their 
individual purposes and to make agreements or contracts with each other. Moreover, they are 
potentially able to found communities in a stronger sense and strive for collective projects if they 
agree about certain views of what constitutes a ‘good life’ for them. 
3.2. Weak collective identities: The we 2/commercium 
Particularistic we 2-groups in the sense of a commercium additionally draw on a ‘collective identity’ in 
the ‘weak’ sense of a shared interpretation of their situation or the awareness of being involved in a 
co-operative enterprise. That, however, does not include common ethical convictions: everybody 
follows only his or her own idiosyncratic desires and purposes. Various motives may be involved—
however, it is not a common, ethically motivated project the members of the we 2/commercium participate 
in. The members see the group rather as a club or neighbourhood (Walzer, 1983: 35-42) or as a kind of 
condominio (Schmitter, 1996, 2000), not as a family. 
Are the EU-citizens a we 2/commercium? In order to find that out we have to try to get access to the 
Europeans’ views about themselves as Europeans. It seems that weak European identities in the sense 
of a we  2/commercium have already developed. Citizens experience in numerous spheres of life that the 
relevant economic, legal, and political space is not longer exclusively the national state. That can be 
demonstrated on the basis of the partial sceptical, but altogether rather pro-active opinions of the EU 
citizens on European politics. Eurobarometer findings indicate that between 41 and 53 percent of the 
Europeans believed in the past decade that they do benefit from membership (European Commission, 
2005: 71). EU-citizens are at least aware of the fact that they are members of the national political 
community as well as the European. Almost 54 percent see themselves as citizens of both (ibid.: 94-
96). The European institutions are quite well known even if their relative importance is not always 
properly understood (ibid.: 106, 109). 
Nonetheless, ‘if the EU were scrapped’, indifference and regrets would be mixed (ibid.: 86-88). 
One does not necessarily love the EU. An overwhelming majority, however, considers the EU a 
reasonable thing and would be even ready to grant it more decision authority under certain 
circumstances. The experience of living in a common legal space and having a common market—at 
first just numerical criteria—seems to lead in the long run to the shared believe of being member of a 
particularistic group—like it or not. This phenomenon is well known and documented also from the 
                                                      
17  By learning words like ‘human,’ ‘animal,’ ‘dead,’ and ‘computer’ children also learn many convictions related to those 
concepts. By learning the system of personal pronouns children learn what it means to be a person, what it means to 
interact with a ‘you,’ to be member of a ‘we’, who is referred to by others as ‘they’. 
18  These beings share a linguistic sense and are prone to be morally offended. Universal principles can be justified based on 
reasoning what is equally good for all of these beings (Apel, 1988). What is a European Identity? The Emergence of a Shared Ethical Self-Understanding in the European Union 
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study of elites who work very much exposed to European institutions like EU officials and Brussels 
correspondents (Laffan, 2004; Lepsius, 2004; Siapera, 2004; Wodak, 2004). 
The national media cover a broad range of European and Europeanised policy issues (Peter / 
Semetko / de Vreese, 2003; Trenz, 2004a). If citizens want to inform themselves about European 
political topics, they can do it in their mother tongue through the national mass media (Kantner, 2004: 
130-162; Trenz, 2004a). There is a transnational mass medial agenda of common European policy 
issues which reinforces the awareness of ‘sitting in the same boat’. However idiosyncratic (e.g. 
individual, interest group specific, regionally, or nationally different) their purposes might be, 
Europeans seem to be quite convinced that, with regard to a growing number of issues, they will 
cooperate with each other in the EU in order to achieve those purposes.  
In a classical liberal as well as in a procedural democratic view this weak identity of a we 2/commercium 
is sufficient for the democratisation of the EU. If one anyway sits in the same boat, one should better 
decide democratically about the rules of coexistence at least for the time of the journey. For our first 
example, European constitutional policies, that would mean that for the parts of a European 
constitution that define the rules of how to properly behave on ‘the boat’ and by which procedures to 
decide about ‘course corrections’ we do not need ‘more’ European identity than we already have. A 
majority of Europeans (68 percent) support the idea of a European constitution (European 
Commission, 2005: 149 f.). Yet, that does not mean that they already agree on the content and the 
objectives codified in a constitution. It is only the parts of a constitution that refer to the basic 
individual rights and the institutions and procedures of governance which can be agreed upon based on 
a weak identity in the sense of a we 2/commercium. The initiation of collective projects and the codification 
of collective aims in a constitution involve a more demanding type of widely shared convictions. 
3.3. Strong collective identities: The we 2/communio 
In everyday life political communities rather resemble the we  2/commercium: ‘Egoistic’ interests are 
negotiated against each other, mutual obligations are established, and contracts are signed and later on 
fulfilled, but the participants primarily follow their own reasons without orientation towards any 
common interest. The affiliation within a community in this minimalistic sense consists of the 
awareness of the individual participants to be—willingly or not—part of the ‘game’ and to be perhaps 
already equipped with certain rights within an institutionalized setting.  
Sometimes there are, however, situations in which another kind of goods is at stake: collective 
instead of individual interests. It might be a major historical event (either catastrophic or fortunate)
19, 
the initiation of a collective project, or a major revision of it—in those situations, suddenly a certain 
nerve might be touched, and people begin to argue quite passionately for their normative convictions 
and values. In such historical situations the political community appears or has to prove itself as value-
integrated we 2/communio. 
The members of a we 2/communio share values
20 regarding a distinct common enterprise. They share 
certain conceptions of what counts for them as a ‘good life’. In light of this conception of a ‘good life’ 
they interpret their past and continue their traditions. Only collective identities in the strong sense 
                                                      
19  The identity of the political community often becomes an object of reflection in the face of dramatic events, in situations 
of perceived crisis, intense social change, or when people try to cope with traumatising collective experiences or striking 
injuries of fundamental, ethical, or moral convictions of the community members (Giesen, 2002, 2004). But it could also 
be major positive changes like the defeat of a dictatorship. 
20  Under values I understand attributes that are reified into ‘goods’. Every attribute (be it ‘democratic,’ ‘great,’ ‘fit’) can 
therefore become a value that is important for the ethical self-understanding of the members of a community who are 
proud of making these values essential for their shared life-form (e.g. ‘democracy’—for Germans today in contrast to 
their ancestors, ‘greatness’—for the ancient Greek, ‘fitness’—for the community of body-builders). Only the group 
members as participating speakers can answer the question for ‘what is good or better for us to do?’ (Tietz, 2001: 113-124). Cathleen Kantner 
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consist of the widely shared ethical self-understanding of the individual members of a we  2/communio. 
This shared ethical self-understanding is ‘inherited’ to a certain degree. Indeed, individuals are born as 
members of existing communities and get socialised into the basic ethical convictions of the group—
later on they deliberately share some of these beliefs and challenge others. But there is also another 
way that leads to strong collective identities: people might come together and create new we 2/communio 
groups in order to pursue a common ethical project.
21 
Especially in the latter case the participants put emphasis on present common problems and the 
question how they want to live together in the future. Collective identity develops through political 
conflict, and political conflict is action-related (Delanty / Rumford, 2005: 51).
22 How the members of 
a community narrate their past, which events in which interpretation are considered to have main 
importance, how events are ranked and so forth depends strongly on how the members of the 
we 2/communio see themselves today and which future they are striving for (compare also: Stråth, 2005). 
For the establishment of far-reaching collective projects a weak collective identity in the sense of a 
we 2/commercium might not be sufficient. It may well be that a certain ‘critical mass’ of public support 
needs to be mobilised in order to institutionalise costly policies (in material and non-material terms, if 
we discuss for example about redistributive social policies, or if the lives of soldiers are put into 
danger). By far, though, not every public debate is an identity-discourse that contributes to the 
clearance of the ethical self-understanding of the community members as communitarian positions 
would suggest (Habermas, 1998: Ch. 9). Only in the face of rather extraordinary problems or conflicts, 
is the shared ethical self-understanding of the community members challenged. In those cases we are 
talking about ‘hot’ ethical convictions.
23 
Does the population of the EU share some sort of an ethical self-understanding? Is there a 
European demos with a collective identity in the strong sense of a we 2/communio? The Eurobarometer is 
an often cited source for the empirical study of the state of an developing European identity in the 
strong sense of a we 2/communio (for a recent overview and analysis see: Citrin / Sides, 2004). A quite 
stable minority of 10 percent of the EU citizens rates their European identity higher than their national 
identity or claims to see themselves as Europeans only (European Commission, 2005: 94). This might 
be properly interpreted as a political statement of deliberate political identification with Europe. The 
aforementioned fact notwithstanding, almost half of all European respondents currently see themselves 
as members of their nation first and Europeans as well, which may rather indicate a we 2/commercium-like 
European identity or just numerical identification.
24 Still, many Europeans (47 percent) associate the 
EU with a feeling of pride (ibid.: 84), more than 60 percent feel some degree of European pride 
(ibid.: 99), and 66 percent feel attached to Europe (ibid.: 103).
25 Asking for ‘identity’ in such a general 
way turns interpretation into a rather problematic undertaking, however. More detailed information on 
                                                      
21   This of course does not yet say anything about the moral justification of such projects: they might even prescribe 
practices that violate basic human rights (e.g. here we might think of xenophobic movements or discriminative cultural 
practices within particularistic groups). This is why liberals as well as proceduralists strongly argued against 
communitarians that universal principles need to define the limits of the autonomy of particularistic groups to design their 
political, cultural or religious practices. 
22   For a similar argument see Risse’s analysis of multiple identities depending on the concerned policy area (Risse, 
2001: 201). 
23  Classical political liberalism tried to exclude ethical issues as much as possible from the public sphere and leave them to 
the realm of private idiosyncrasies. This was one lesson learned from the religious wars that shook Europe in the 17th 
century. Yet, in a dynamically changing society this legalistic method transforms controversial ethical issues too early 
into judicial ones and hence perpetuates existing injustice against discriminated groups and ignorance of the legitimate 
demands of new social movements (Benhabib, 1992). 
24   About 40 percent explicitly consider themselves members of the national political community only, which can be 
interpreted as political statement of reservation against the EU (ibid.). 
25  Over 80 percent of EU-citizens feel national pride (ibid.: 99). What is a European Identity? The Emergence of a Shared Ethical Self-Understanding in the European Union 
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whether the EU-citizens express shared basic convictions of what they think is the right way to live 
together can be obtained from issue related survey data.  
With regard to our second example, social policies, Eurobarometer findings indicate that these 
issues are very important for EU-citizens (especially unemployment, health care and pensions). 
Nevertheless, the European Union is considered to influence this policy field rather negatively 
(ibid.: 27 ff.). With regard to the Iraq war, many observers have the impression that EU-citizens—in 
both the old and the new member states—were quite united in their ethical views (Habermas / Derrida, 2003). 
With regard to our third example, defence and security policy, Eurobarometer has developed 
somewhat more detailed questions in recent years. Defence and foreign affairs seem to be less 
important, but citizens evaluate the EU’s role in this field positively (European Commission, 
2005: 27 ff.). On average citizens express much support for the CFSP/ESDP and value the EU’s role 
in the world and its effects on world politics in generally positive terms in comparison to the role of 
the U.S. (ibid.:  116-129). Clear differences between the aforementioned majority opinions in the 
member states are also evident, however, when it comes to the details of this policy (i.e. the desired 
degree of independence from the U.S. or the active promotion of human rights) (ibid.: 124). 
Another way to study whether a European identity in a strong sense is developing is media content 
analysis of debates on European policy issues with an ethical dimension. The findings of many 
empirical media content analyses meanwhile lead to the conclusion that a similar set of frames 
prevails when European issues are debated in different countries (Risse, 2002: 15). Surprisingly, this 
also holds true with regard to ethical issues: instead of twenty five different national frames of 
meaning on each topic, there are merely a couple of normative positions that are critically debated in 
each country. This pattern emerged in the debate about European sanctions against Austria when the 
right wing populist FPÖ came in second in the 1999 national elections and entered the government 
coalition in 2000 (Rauer / Rivet / van de Steeg, 2002; van de Steeg, 2004). A similar pattern occurred 
in the media discourse about the European constitution (Trenz, 2004b; Fossum / Trenz, 2005; 
Oberhuber et al., 2005). A cosmopolitan European identity—at least with respect to the outside 
world—may emerge (Delanty  / Rumford, 2005: 189-195). In other debates—e.g. about the 
introduction of the common currency (Risse, 2003) and the Kosovo intervention (Grundmann / Smith / 
Wright, 2000)—national narrations and particular historical experiences differ to a further degree, but 
still the universe of possible ethical views is very clearly structured along similar ethical viewpoints 
being debated in every country. 
This does not emerge from any kind of central coordination or force. Speakers in the public realm, 
editorial staff, and journalists seem to perceive these ethically sensitive issues as common European 
problems of broad public interest. Fundamental questions like ‘how do we, as EU-citizens, want to 
live together?’ and ‘what is good or better for us as Europeans to do?’ in many crucial policy fields are 
already intensively discussed in the European public sphere—even if they still remain largely unanswered. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper tried to contribute to the clarification of important conceptual questions regarding the 
scholarly debate on collective identities in general and the European identity in particular. 
(1) In public debate and scientific discourses it is quite common to try to answer the question of 
who might possibly belong to the European Union by identifying some ‘objective’ measures that 
would allow a categorisation of a certain group of people as European or not. Contrary to these 
strategies, we can conclude that the problem of a European identity cannot be solved by classification 
or as we called it numerical identification. It might be that people who share identifiable 
characteristics in time and space fail entirely to see themselves as group members or that they, despite 
not having ‘European’ geographical, ethnic, religious, and historical features, do consider themselves 
as a—not yet recognised—part of the community. The poor, women, and political minorities claimed Cathleen Kantner 
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equal rights in national democracies’ history in a similar fashion. If something is to be said about 
European identity in the qualitative sense, one has to evaluate how Europeans see themselves as Europeans. 
(2) It can be further stated, that Tönnies’ conceptual decision to put society (commercium) and 
community (communio) into radical opposition and, moreover, to idealise the communio led the 
tradition that followed him to rule out from analysis a whole universe of we-groups. This pushes 
empirical investigators who find certain shared convictions among the members of commercium-like 
groups into difficulties that can only be solved by stretching the concept of the communio. In so doing, 
they certainly contributed to the conceptual confusion criticised by Brubaker / Cooper (2000), 
Niethammer (2000) and others. We-groups in the weak sense of a we 2/commercium consist of members 
that refer to themselves as ‘we’. They share certain beliefs about their common undertakings without 
holding shared ethical convictions. In everyday life political communities rather resemble a 
we 2/commercium. This in turn has important virtues. As a matter of fact, it is a central civilising 
achievement of the liberal state of law and modern representative democracy to organise political life 
by procedures for conflict resolution without pressure to reach consensus on values. Citizens in a 
democracy have the right to be different and distant from each other. The pluralism of values and the 
search for political compromises is, in addition, an important mechanism for peaceful change and 
reform in modern democracies. 
(3) With regard to the European Union as we  2/commercium, we sketched indications for a widely 
shared perception of ‘sitting in the same boat’ and the conception that the EU is a relevant level of 
governance that is relevant to citizens’ lives. The EU citizens are aware that there is a European 
economic and legal space which progressively shapes their everyday life in a multitude of policy 
matters. Most consider this aspect—for different reasons—to be a useful thing. This positive 
assessment though, does not mean that they have already agreed on shared conceptions of a ‘good 
life’. This weak identity, however, is sufficient for democratic institutions to function. A missing 
European identity in this perspective remains a poor excuse for not democratising the EU political system. 
(4) Moreover, European identity discourses have taken place with regard to many issues. Although, 
shared ethical convictions may emerge with respect to the concerned policy areas over time, this of 
course would have to be researched in much more detail.
26 Methodologically, it seems to be 
worthwhile to analyse the processes of political identity formation policy-issue by policy-issue instead 
of speaking in an undifferentiated and general manner of ‘the collective identity’. It is logically 
possible that ‘we 2’ as the members of a certain nation (or as citizens of the EU) share many ethical 
views on welfare politics but not on genetic technology—or the other way around. The issues 
concerned may also be debated as a matter of compromise between different interests to a certain 
degree and as an ethical issue to a varying extent. The EU as a citizens community develops 
characteristics of both—a we 2/commercium and a we 2/communio. 
(5) It has also been stressed that collective identities in the strong sense develop through political 
conflict. They do not emerge out of thin air, but rather in broad public debates about deep conflicts on 
value-laden policy issues. This point implies that big identity-political campaigns are very likely to 
miss their aims. Why should modern, self-conscious, and rather sceptical citizens be impressed by 
someone attempting to impose an artificial ‘identity’ on them? How should self-appointed ‘identity-
constructors’ be able to ‘create’ identities, to make citizens ‘more European,’ and to fabricate a kind of 
‘homo europaeicus’? Instead, ordinary citizens seldom talk about collective identity as such. They 
sometimes discover ethically relevant aspects of selected controversial issues. A ‘collective identity’ 
in the strong sense emerges (if it emerges at all) in the group members’ discourses about important 
                                                      
26  The author is part of a research project on discourses about military and humanitarian interventions in European and U.S. 
quality newspapers: ‘In search of a role in world politics. The Common Foreign- and Security Policy (CFSP) in light of 
debates in European mass media, 1990-2004.’ The project is conducted at Free University Berlin and funded by the 
German Research Foundation (RI 798/8-1). It is led by Thomas Risse and Cathleen Kantner. What is a European Identity? The Emergence of a Shared Ethical Self-Understanding in the European Union 
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policy issues.
27 What can be done in order to further the character of the EU as we 2/communio is debating 
and tackling the issues that the broader public deems highly important and openly discussing policy 
alternatives and possible choices. 
Constitutional policy, redistributive social policy, security and defence, immigration, internal 
security, and biotechnology policies are among the most challenging ethical problems on the EU’s 
policy agenda. The answers to the open policy questions have not yet been found. It is only clear, that 
Europe has to find common solutions for the challenges. Sharing a collective identity in both the weak 
and the strong sense does not mean, though, that conflicts disappear. The hope that identity would 
make things easier will certainly be disappointed. Identity discourses do occur because ‘we 2’ have 
different views on ethically problematic issues. Differences will remain. Hence, a shared collective 
identity in the strong sense should be rather conceived as a ‘normative corridor,’ one that is large 
enough for internal conflicts. Intra-European conflicts can be expected to be an ongoing feature, but 
they are no insurmountable obstacle to collective action. In a liberal democratic community one can 
agree upon common policies without ‘speaking with one voice’. 
Needless to say, human convictions can always be wrong. Occasionally, the wrong decisions will 
be reached. Our choices today will be our common past soon—burdened with guilt or reason for pride 
of our achievements. The future European identity will rise from both the positive experiences we will 
make together and the crises that we may (not) overcome. A new reflexive political tradition can only 
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27  For the pragmatist model of community building by co-operative problem-solving see Dewey (1927; for the case of the 
EU compare: Kantner, 2004: Ch. 4). Cathleen Kantner 
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